Iraq Invasion was Unjustified

Today the second phase of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence report on the justifications for the invasion of Iraq was released. (PDFs: Phase II, Post War Findings and Phase II, Use of INC Intelligence) We have been anxiously awaiting this report ever since Minority Leader Harry Reid ordered the Senate into closed session last year. The conclusions are as expected: none of the justifications used by the administration in the case for invasion were proven correct. In fact, most have been proven entirely bogus.

I will detail some of the main conclusions below.

The report is divided into essentially 4 important parts:

• WMD capabilities of Iraq (pdf #1, II)
• Iraq's links to Al-Qaida (pdf #1, III)
• The intent of the Saddam Hussein regime (pdf #1, IV)
• And intelligence provided by the Iraqi National Congress (INC) (pdf #2)

WMD

The first part explores the claims made about Iraq's chemical, biological, and nuclear capabilities and programs. Information comes mainly from the National Intelligence Estimate issued to the President by the CIA in 2002 called Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction. The committee judges that NIE to be the most comprehensive assessment by the intelligence community on pre-war claims. It is also the NIE that was selectively leaked by the administration to justify Bush's language in the January 2003 State of the Union address.

The committee then compared the NIE to findings by the Iraq Survey Group which was charged with uncovering any and all evidence of non-conventional weapons in Iraq. Most of the conclusions below have been identified in the media previously, but looking at an officially compiled list of the debunkings is very powerful.

My quick summary of conclusions regarding WMD in Iraq:

1. Iraq had no nuclear program since 1991.
2. Aluminum tubes were to be used for a rocket program. The high quality was to increase accuracy.
3. The Niger yellowcake story comes from forged documents. The committee will continue to investigate the source of the forgeries.
4. Biological and chemical weapons were destroyed by 1996. Any shells found by the ISG were lost, forgotten, old, and/or worthless.
5. Mobile labs were for hydrogen production.
6. 'Curveball' fabricated the story of number 5 (because he was tortured), and this evidence was dismissed by DIA and CIA in May, 2004.
7. Iraq had no chemical weapons program.
8. Iraq had no covert SCUD missiles.
9. The UAV program was for reconnaissance, and reports of Iraq acquiring US mapping software are coincidental.

Al-Qaida

The next part of the report details the claims about Iraq's contact with, support of, or other connection to Al-Qaida or other terrorist organizations. The myth of these connections is an ongoing problem in the national debate over the Iraq occupation because the idea is compelling, but the evidence is simply non-existent.

My summary of conclusions regarding Iraq's terrorist connections:

1. Saddam Hussein viewed extremist organizations as a threat to his own power and did not respond to requests for aid from Al-Qaida.
2. Only one contact between an Iraqi official and a member of Al-Qaida ever occurred: in Sudan in 1996. It was initiated by Al-Qaida and was never repeated. Two other attempts were made by Al-Qaida, but they were rebuffed by Saddam.
3. Claims by Al-Libi that Iraq provided Al-Qaida with chemical or biological weapons training were completely fabricated.
4. The Salman Pak facility was not used to train Al-Qaida in any way. Nor did Al-Qaida train anywhere else in Iraq.
5. Zarqawi was in Iraq from May 2002 until November 2002. Saddam not only did not support Zarqawi, he had the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) looking for him unsuccessfully.
6. Although the terrorist group Ansar al-Islam was operating in Kurdish northern Iraq after 1991, Saddam viewed the group as a threat and attempted to infiltrate it. In fact, a document shows that Saddam was worried about the connection the US was attempting to make between Iraq, Ansar al-Islam, and al-Qaida.
7. The two leads suggesting Iraq knew of and was complicit in the attacks of 9/11 are bogus.
8. Iraq did not consider using terrorist attacks on the US in retaliation during the invasion. Any such retaliation would come from covert operations by IIS.
9. These conclusions are unlikely to be overturned by new evidence as all important documents have been exploited.

Have you seen anything yet that even remotely resembles anything the administration claimed with definitive language before the invasion? Have you seen anything yet that approaches any actual threat to American security?

Saddam's Intent

In a less well-referenced justification for invasion, it was suggested that Saddam was intent on hiding his WMD and, therefore, he must have something to hide. This self-referential argument is invalid. Saddam's intent in deceiving the world with regards to its WMD was most likely to balance efforts to lift sanctions with the need to maintain a threat in the region to "give pause" to Iran.

My summary of conclusions regarding Saddam's regime's intent:

1. Intelligence estimates misjudged the effectiveness of sanctions. Saddam was attempting to get sanctions lifted, but had no known plans for reconstituting his WMD programs in the post-sanctions era.
2. Saddam was more concerned about balancing power in the region with Iran and Israel than a US invasion. Deception concerning the WMD programs served to "give pause" to Iran.

Iraqi National Congress

The INC, led by Ahmed Chalabi, provided a great deal of intelligence in the lead up to the Iraqi invasion. The relationship of American intelligence and the INC has a shaky history, and Chalabi himself is a shady character. The committee did not go into great length regarding this history or the way in which the INC acquired intelligence for the US.

My summary of conclusions regarding INC intelligence:

1. INC-affiliated sources provided false information that was disseminated throughout the intelligence community.
2. The INC attempted to influence US policy through false information.
3. INC 'Source Two' (name redacted) "was a serious error". The DIA actually issued a fabrication notice that was ignored.
4. [redacted]
5. Renewing funding of the INC despite DIA misgivings was "ill-advised".
6. [redacted]
7. DIA and CIA were inconsistent in appraisals of INC intelligence.
8. There is "insufficient basis" for assuming 'curveball' gave false information on behalf of the INC.

The part of Phase II of the committee investigation that deals with the administration's misuse of intelligence is still forthcoming, but these parts of the report lay out the factual groundwork for assessing the intent of the administration.

It is completely inconceivable that we would continue to occupy Iraq after determining that everything touted as evidence of our need to do so has been thoroughly debunked. Some investigations continue, but the administration essentially did nothing right when it came to justifying the invasion.